Benin’s Coup Attempt and the Unfinished Project of African Statehood

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, 2025, soldiers in Benin attempted to seize power, declaring on national television that President Patrice Talon had been removed from office. They announced the suspension of the constitution, dissolved state institutions, and closed borders, portraying themselves as arbiters of a new political order. Within hours, loyalist forces had restored control, but the episode was far more than an isolated disruption. It was the latest sign of a persistent, structural tension in African politics, where the state often exists less as a guarantor of citizens’ interests than as a theatre of competing claims to legitimacy. The attempted coup in Benin is not simply a military gambit; it is a symptom of the continent’s ongoing struggle to define what governance, authority, and citizenship should mean in the postcolonial era.

West Africa is no longer insulated from a pattern that has roiled the Sahel for most of this decade. Mali’s successive coups under Colonel Assimi Goita, Guinea’s overthrow of Alpha Condé, Chad’s military succession following Idriss Déby’s death, Burkina Faso’s two coups in 2022, and Niger’s seizure of power in 2023 together constitute what analysts have termed a Sahelian “coup belt.” The wave continued with last month’s military takeover in Guinea-Bissau. These events, while geographically concentrated, are connected by a deeper, shared reality: the continent’s political institutions are fragile, and the social contract between state and citizen remains precarious. Africa’s democratic experiment, though legally codified in constitutions and regional charters such as the Lomé Declaration, has often failed to deliver the expectations of its people.

Legitimacy, or the lack thereof, is central to understanding why coups persist, and colonial inheritance looms large in this context. Boundaries were drawn for expedience rather than cultural coherence, and administrative systems were designed to control populations, not serve them. Militaries, conceived as instruments of coercion, continue to operate with disproportionate influence, often stepping into the political void left by civilian governments that cannot guarantee security, economic stability, or responsive governance. Often, civilian governments will employ armed forces to clamp down on dissent, a practice that undermines the legitimacy of even supposedly democratic administrations.

This structural predisposition is compounded by the uneven performance of democracy. Afrobarometer surveys across 36 countries between 2021 and 2022 indicate that fewer than four in ten citizens believe democracy delivers on its promise. While elections remain a theoretically democratic tool, only 44 percent of Africans polled believe they can remove unresponsive leaders, and in many countries — including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — support for electoral processes has steadily declined over the past decade. The disconnect between formal institutions and lived reality renders coups less shocking and, in some cases, more comprehensible to the public.

Economic grievance intensifies this sense of disconnection. Rising inflation, limited employment opportunities, and endemic corruption fuel the perception that political elites enrich themselves at the expense of the wider population. In Guinea, Mali, and Niger, military leaders justified their interventions by citing corruption and the failure of civilian administrations to meet basic economic and security needs. Analysts point to the high cost of living and systemic inequality as key drivers of public indifference or tacit support for military rule. When citizens feel abandoned or excluded from meaningful political participation, coups cease to be anomalies and instead become instruments through which the idea of order, accountability, and corrective governance is contested.

Foreign influence adds another layer of complexity. In the Sahel, Russia has cultivated ties with military-led states, while France and other Western partners maintain relationships with civilian-led governments, as seen in Benin. France provided intelligence and logistical support to Benin as well as Nigeria, in countering the attempted coup, highlighting how external involvement shapes the calculus of legitimacy. These interactions are often interpreted domestically as evidence that governments are beholden to foreign powers, a perception the Sahelian juntas exploit to consolidate support. ECOWAS’s inconsistent responses — mobilizing troops to defend Talon while largely observing coups elsewhere — further erode confidence in regional institutions. Such disparities reinforce the notion that intervention is selective and politically motivated, leaving the legitimacy of constitutional order contingent rather than inherent.

The psychological dimension is equally significant. Citizens navigate a landscape in which the state can be present and coercive one moment and absent the next, reinforcing political apathy or conditional support for alternatives, including military governance. Coups, therefore, operate as both a political and cultural narrative: they purport to embody corrective authority, often invoking nationalism or anti-corruption rhetoric, and frame the military as a necessary counterweight to a civilian administration perceived as ineffective or self-serving. In Benin, as in the broader region, the narrative surrounding the attempted coup reflects this recurring pattern, where legitimacy is contested not only between civilians and soldiers but between the state and its citizens.

The wider continental picture reinforces this interpretation. Since 2020, at least nine African countries have experienced successful military takeovers, alongside numerous failed attempts. The wave has exposed structural weaknesses shared across states: fragile institutions, unequal economies, poorly integrated security systems, and persistent foreign influence. Yet it has also illuminated the gap between citizens’ expectations and governmental performance. Electoral processes that fail to translate popular will into meaningful accountability, economic stagnation, and political disenfranchisement all create an environment where coups can be seen as plausible, even corrective, interventions. This is particularly evident in West Africa, where ECOWAS’ decisive response to the Benin attempt contrasted sharply with its muted approach to coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, reflecting a mixture of security calculations, regional influence, and domestic political interest.

Ultimately, the attempted coup in Benin serves as a prism through which the unresolved challenges of African statehood are revealed. Military interventions highlight not just the fragility of particular administrations but the unfinished project of legitimacy and governance throughout the continent. Coups expose the enduring consequences of colonial-era state design, the failure of democratic consolidation, and the complex interplay of domestic discontent with foreign involvement. They are not simply power grabs; they are reflections of a society negotiating the meaning of authority, accountability, and civic inclusion. African citizens confront a state that oscillates between neglect and coercion, leaving them to question the purpose and promise of governance. Benin’s brief crisis, therefore, is neither an anomaly nor a final chapter. It is a reminder that the continent is still defining its political identity, negotiating the obligations of the state, and wrestling with what legitimacy truly means in the postcolonial era.