On March 31, 2026, Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs minister, Ambassador Yussuf Tuggar, resigned from his ministerial role, in line with the president’s directive requesting all political appointees intending to pursue elective roles in the 2027 general elections to resign their appointments on or before March 31, 2026.
Yusuf Maitama Tuggar was born on March 12, 1967, to the late Senator Abubakar Tuggar. Abubakar Tuggar was a prominent figure in Nigerian politics who served as the publicity secretary of the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) between 1956 and 1966, a member of the House of Representatives from 1979 to 1983, and later as a senator. He was prominent for his pro-Sharia stance. Yusuf Tuggar completed his primary and secondary school education in Nigeria, obtained a degree in International Relations from United States International University in San Diego, and a Master’s Degree from the University of Cambridge. He served in the House of Representatives from 2007 to 2011. In 2017, he was appointed by the late President Muhammadu Buhari as Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany, and in 2023, he was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs by President Bola Tinubu.
One of the major talking points of President Bola Tinubu’s inaugural speech was foreign policy. He pointed to instability across Africa and to neighbouring countries deviating from democracy, a “pressing concern.” “We shall also retool our foreign policy to more actively lead the regional and continental quest for collective prosperity. On this day, Nigeria affirms its rightful place among the world’s great democracies. There, Nigeria shall reside forever,” he prophesied. Amb. Yusuf Tuggar’s role as President Tinubu’s Foreign Minister was to articulate the president’s foreign policy vision for the country on the international plane. Curiously, while Mr President gave an air of intentionality in relation to his tenure’s foreign policy, this posture was undercut early on by his decision to recall all ambassadors, without a replacement. This left Nigeria’s diplomatic missions abroad without substantive representation for nearly 31 months, handing Amb. Tuggar had a difficult start to his tenure.
To mark the offshoot of his stint as the minister of foreign affairs, Tuggar, during an exhibition at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introduced President Tinubu’s 4D Foreign Policy Diplomacy, “centered on development, democracy, demography, and diaspora.” Through this, he noted, the leadership of President Bola Tinubu can “find modern solutions to address complex modern problems.” In several public addresses and interviews that followed, Amb. Tuggar explained that the thrust of this administration’s foreign policy is to position Nigeria as an “autonomous” entity open to deals with all “friendly nations,” to campaign for the restoration of democracy across West African states (and even Africa at large).
This foreign policy drive also focused on addressing external dependency by leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and positioning Nigeria as a leader in global markets. It also includes bringing to bear the “potential” of Nigeria’s populous demography, advertising the country’s ever-dynamic youthful population across multiple sectors to put them on the global work stage. The last arm of the doctrine also included harnessing the power and leverage of the Nigerian Diaspora for economic incentives through remittances.
When not held to scrutiny, Amb. Tuggar can easily lead anyone to believe that he outlined a solid framework or policy for the country on the international stage. But under closer scrutiny, the framework is insufficiently defined. For example, the pillar of democracy is called into question. Under this tenure, Nigeria has been unable to uphold democratic leadership even amongst countries in West Africa. Since President Tinubu was sworn into office in May 2023, there have been about four coups in West Africa, which his foreign policy mission, led by Amb. Tuggar has been unable to reverse. The coup in Niger State is one of a series of coups in West Africa that highlight this. Following the coup, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed wide sanctions on Niger, which included the closure of borders, suspension of commercial and financial transactions between ECOWAS and Niger; Nigeria also cut electricity supply to Niger and halted trade with it. However, all these failed to yield a return to democracy in Nigeria and merely caused significant hardship for the citizens of Niger. The economic leverage that ought to have compelled a return to democracy for the state was poorly deployed by Nigeria and ECOWAS.
The other issue associated with this pillar of Tuggar-Tinubu’s foreign policy concerns the metric for defining democratic values. Where does this policy stand in relation to African leaders who manipulate constitutions or elections to stay in power? In his analysis of Tinubu’s 4D doctrine, Professor Femi Mimiko astutely points out that the policy requires “clarification” and “more realistic goals.”
Even the doctrine’s economic pillar faces its own challenges. While the minister aimed to achieve economic independence of African countries and promote intracontinental trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Nigeria’s reliance on foreign borrowing complicates efforts to end Western dependence. Most recently, on March 31, 2026, the National Assembly approved a new $6 billion external loan package, increasing Nigeria’s $110.3 billion debt stock.
Similarly, the push for economic interdependence of African countries and the promotion of intra-continental free trade clash with Nigeria’s current visa regime. For many African countries, entry into Africa is a cumbersome process. This problem is compounded by the uneven application of the reciprocity principle with countries that offer Nigerians visa-free access. It is therefore understandable that Nigeria’s position on the Africa Visa Openness Index has slipped from sixth place in 2024 to 32nd position under Amb. Tuggar’s foreign policy.
Perhaps the most defining low point of Tuggar’s tenure as the Minister of Foreign Affairs came in the aftermath of President Trump’s unprecedented designation of Nigeria as a ‘country of particular concern’ (CPC), accompanied by threats of “swift military action” and the withdrawal of US financial support. In the days that followed, the minister was at pains to refute the claim that the violence erupting in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria was religiously motivated, despite widespread reports linking the attacks and deaths to religious intolerance. In one of his sour outings, the minister’s performance on Piers Morgan Uncensored drew criticisms as he wobbled, unable to assert a coherent position on the rising violence and escalating controversy.
Tuggar has even struggled to put his foot down on even easier, less controversial issues under the nose. The social embarrassment of Nigeria at the ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD9), held in Yokohama, Japan, from August 20–22, 2025, tells us so. On the event’s opening day, the Nigerian booth was left unmanned. Although the special adviser to the president on information and strategy, Mr Bayo Onanuga, claimed in a release that the delegation was “laser-focused” on its core objectives of achieving tangible outcomes from the scheduled lineup of bilateral and multilateral engagements targeted at driving optimum performance in key sectors of the economy, especially in power, industry, and agriculture. These justifications are unconvincing, and they imply that staffing exhibition booths would derail other summit duties, that other countries that staffed their own booths were merely for appearance, and that staffing the booth necessarily requires the presence of top Nigerian executives.
While Tuggar may try to put up an enterprising front with fanciful speeches and frameworks, there is only so much Nigeria can achieve with its foreign diplomacy. Our experience with foreign policy suggests that diplomatic policy and global outlook correspond to its domestic policy and buoyancy. Therefore, a country with ailing socioeconomic conditions and failing domestic strategy cannot adopt a venturesome posture on the international scene. Nigeria is a country beleaguered by so many crises, economic instability, insecurity, and political dysfunction. All of which have combined to weaken any potency Yussuf Tuggar and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have attempted to foment on the international plane.
Essentially, the purpose of foreign policy is to convert external engagement into domestic gains. To put it differently, diplomatic handshakes and cross-continent junketing without meaningful returns such as Foreign Direct Investment, trade inflows, or expanded migratory pathways is simply performative diplomacy. Speaking with Channels TV on January 6, 2025, former permanent secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amb. Joe Keshi remarked that Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Tinubu, as led by Yussuf Tuggar, has been a ‘mixed bag’.
He observed that while several memoranda of agreement have been signed, nothing has been implemented. In their expert commentary on March 17, 2026, Chatham House rightly noted that despite Tuggar’s elaborate articulation of the 4D diplomacy, it “has not largely translated into improvements in material conditions for most Nigerians,” emphasizing that “Nigeria’s diplomatic capacity has lagged behind its rhetoric.” This is perhaps a summary of Tuggar’s legacy as Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Following a lacklustre tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tuggar has set his sights on Bauchi’s governorship for the fourth time. The questions that remain are these: what are his chances, given his string of losses in this same contest, and even if he somehow prevails this time, does his ministerial record not foreshadow an equally lacklustre performance for Bauchi State?
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