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Last month in Washington, D.C., the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) sat side-by-side in the Oval Office to sign an agreement that, on paper, promises to end three decades of recurring war in Africa’s Great Lakes region. Brokered by the Trump administration and witnessed by the State of […]
Last month in Washington, D.C., the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) sat side-by-side in the Oval Office to sign an agreement that, on paper, promises to end three decades of recurring war in Africa’s Great Lakes region. Brokered by the Trump administration and witnessed by the State of Qatar, the deal, quickly dubbed the “Washington Accord” by U.S. Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos, was hailed by President Trump as “a glorious triumph for the cause of peace.”
The signing was accompanied by commitments to create a “regional economic integration framework,” pledges of U.S. investment in Eastern DRC’s vast mineral reserves, and a promise that Presidents Paul Kagame and Félix Tshisekedi would return to Washington in July to sign follow-up agreements.
For a region battered by violence, mass displacement, and economic collapse, such diplomatic breakthrough should be cause for optimism. Yet, beneath the applause and photo-ops lies an uneasy question: is this a genuine peace or merely a new chapter in an old story, one in which foreign powers broker temporary calm to secure long-term access to the DRC’s critical minerals?
The ceremony in Washington marked the culmination of more than a year of stop-start diplomacy involving the U.S., Angola, Kenya, Qatar, Togo, and the African Union, and while the DRC and Rwanda have signed and broken peace deals before, this latest effort began in late 2023, when tensions between the two countries were at its zenith ahead of DRC’s presidential elections.
At the time, Kinshasa accused Kigali of backing the M23 rebel group, an allegation Rwanda denies as M23 launched a major offensive in eastern Congo. The United States, alarmed at the prospect of renewed regional war, dispatched its then-director of national intelligence to shuttle between Kinshasa and Kigali. Early talks produced a fragile commitment to de-escalation, monitored in part by innovative U.S. mechanisms for real-time verification.
In mid-2024, Angola, which has long played a mediation role via the Luanda Process, announced that the countries had agreed to a long-term cease-fire, but the peace deal collapsed in December 2024, when M23 fighters embarked on a devastating campaign across Eastern DRC. The cease-fire text had lacked “built-in” consequences for violations, but Washington responded by imposing sanctions on Rwandan and M23 officials.
In March 2025, Qatar’s emir revived the process, personally meeting Presidents Kagame and Tshisekedi in Doha. The appointment of Massad Boulos in April as U.S. senior advisor for Africa marked a renewed American push, now in close coordination with Qatar, and again by late June, the outlines of a peace deal had emerged.
The Minerals Question
The Washington Accord contains familiar provisions. A mutual commitment to respect each other’s territorial integrity, an end to hostilities, with Rwanda agreeing to withdraw from Congolese territory within 90 days, a pledge by both parties to bring about an “irreversible and verifiable end” to support for militias, disengagement, disarmament, and conditional integration of non-state armed groups, and expansion of humanitarian access, return of displaced populations, and reaffirmation of the U.N. mission in DRC’s mandate.
A joint security coordination mechanism will oversee implementation, with the U.S. and Qatar acting as observers. The “regional economic integration framework,” which was signed at the White House in July, will address trade and investment, including, sources say, direct U.S. participation in DRC’s mineral sector.
That last point is crucial. Eastern DRC is home to enormous reserves of cobalt, coltan, lithium, copper, and gold, all critical for everything from smartphones to electric vehicles. These resources are both a prize and a curse: they could power the DRC’s development, but historically they have fueled violence, corruption, and foreign interference.
M23, according to multiple reports, finances itself through illicit taxation and control of mining areas such as Rubaya, earning significant monthly sums. The group’s resurgence has coincided with a global spike in demand for strategic minerals, underscoring the link between economic interests and instability.
Though the Washington Accord’s text is silent on the mineral sector, insiders suggest that the Trump administration’s diplomatic push accelerated after President Tshisekedi indicated willingness to facilitate U.S. investment in Congolese mining. The strategy is clear: reduce Chinese dominance in African supply chains by securing a direct line to the DRC’s resources. The upcoming economic integration framework is expected to formalize this arrangement.
For all the diplomatic fanfare, the context in which this agreement was negotiated raises an uncomfortable truth: it could be less about creating durable peace for the Congolese people and more about securing a stable, U.S.-friendly environment for extracting the DRC’s mineral wealth.
The United States has made no secret of its aim to reduce Chinese dominance in Africa’s critical minerals sector. For over a decade, Chinese companies, often backed by state financing and operating through long-term concession deals, have controlled large portions of the DRC’s cobalt and copper production. In a clean-energy-driven global marketplace, control over these resources is not merely commercial but geopolitical.
In this peace deal, Washington positions itself as both a security guarantor and a preferred economic partner for Kinshasa, but this stability is not being pursued in a vacuum; it is being tied, albeit discreetly, to U.S. commercial entry into mineral extraction. Sources close to the talks indicate that President Tshisekedi’s willingness to grant American companies direct access to mining concessions was a key factor in re-engaging high-level U.S. diplomacy.
The “regional economic integration framework” is expected to lock in these arrangements. While the public messaging will focus on “mutual economic growth” and “regional trade facilitation,” the reality is likely to include preferential terms for American firms: expedited licensing, tax incentives, and long-term offtake agreements guaranteeing supply to U.S. markets. If precedent holds, these will be negotiated behind closed doors, with little public scrutiny in the DRC and no guarantees that revenues will be transparently managed or equitably distributed.
Such arrangements carry the hallmarks of neo-colonial extraction. Instead of direct colonial rule, foreign powers now secure influence through economic leverage, tying local political elites to contracts that serve foreign capital’s priorities. Public-facing promises of infrastructure investment or “capacity building” often mask the fact that the bulk of profits, decision-making power, and strategic control remain abroad.
Historically, this pattern has played out repeatedly in the DRC. Under King Leopold II, it was rubber and ivory, extracted at a catastrophic human cost. Under Belgian colonial rule, it was copper, cobalt, and uranium, shipped to Europe and North America with minimal reinvestment in Congolese society. Even after independence, Cold War politics saw Western powers backing Mobutu Sese Seko’s dictatorship in exchange for privileged mineral access, enriching the elite while deepening poverty.
The modern iteration is updated for the 21st century: cobalt and lithium are the new “oil.” The method remains the same: secure a political agreement, neutralize major armed threats, and create a perception of stability just long enough to lock in multi-decade extraction deals.
The risk is that ordinary Congolese will see only marginal benefits. Without strong and enforceable provisions for revenue-sharing with local communities, environmental protections, and labour rights, this peace could become a “peace dividend” for America’s supply chain security, not for Congolese livelihoods.
Washington’s interest extends beyond green technologies. Critical minerals are also essential for U.S. defense manufacturing, from fighter jet components to missile guidance systems. In that sense, securing access serves not only economic but also military-industrial priorities.
Unless the July agreements are made fully transparent, subject to parliamentary oversight in Kinshasa, and paired with enforceable commitments to reinvest profits into Congolese development, the Washington Accord risks becoming another chapter in the DRC’s long saga of resource plunder, this time, signed and sealed under the banner of peace.
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